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I. INTRODUCTION
In today's litigious society, many businesses have found it
advantageous to include arbitration clauses in their business contracts.'
While this can reduce time and expense litigating most problems, what
happens when the bone of contention is the terms of the arbitration? Such is
the case in Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Systems, Inc.
Initially, the dispute in Aviall focused on how one party booked a
financial transaction. 2 When submitted to arbitration, however, the issue
grew much larger to "whether an arbitrator could honestly and fairly
arbitrate a dispute between two companies when the arbitrator had (and
continues to have) a pre-existing relationship with one of the parties?" 3 The
matter wound up in litigation, first at the district court level4 and then, on
appeal, before the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit, consistent with
precedent and the surrounding case law, held that a court could not remove
an arbitrator for "potential" bias.5
II. BACKGROUND
This matter arose when Ryder System, Inc. (Ryder), a conglomerate of
transportation businesses, decided to consolidate and "spin-off" its aviation
related businesses under the name, Aviall, Inc. (Aviall) to Ryder's own
shareholders. 6 Pursuant to this spin-off, officers and directors from Ryder
and Aviall signed a contract known as the Distribution and Indemnity
* 110 F.3d 892 (2d Cir. 1997).
1 See Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Claims with Special Reference to the Three A's-Access, Adjudication, and
Acceptability, 31 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 231, 238 (1996).
2 See Aviall, 110 F.3d at 894.
3 Id. at 895.
4 See Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Systems, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
5 See Aviall, 110 F.3d at 895.
6 See id. at 893.
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Agreement (Distribution Agreement). 7 This agreement was consented to by
both Ryder's and Aviall's Boards of Directors and was executed. 8
The Distribution Agreement stipulated that Aviall was to have an initial
net worth of $314 million. 9 To that end, the Distribution Agreement
included a "Distribution Statement" devising how Aviall's and Ryder's
assets were to be divided as well as the amount of debt repayments and
dividends that Aviall would owe to Ryder in order to reduce Aviall's net
worth to the targeted amount. 10
Furthermore, section 3.03(c) of the Distribution Agreement required
that "[i]f there are any items related to the Distribution Statement which are
in dispute, then such items shall be submitted to KPMG Peat
Marwick ... for resolution." 11 In other words, Aviall and Ryder explicitly
agreed to resolve any disputes contained in the Distribution Statement by
arbitration before KPMG Peat Marwick. At the time of the spin-off, KPMG
was the accountant for both Ryder and Aviall and, as such, was familiar
with both the financial statements and the terms of the Distribution
Statement. 12
One item of particular note was that the Distribution Statement required
Ryder to retain all pension assets and obligations of Aviall's employees up
to the date of the spin-off, while Aviall would be responsible for all
postdivestiture pension benefits.13 Ryder then sought to record its pension
liabilities to Aviall as a prepaid expense asset, thereby increasing Aviall's
net worth by $17.6 million. 14 This would then allow Ryder to require
Aviall to give up $17.6 million in other assets to Ryder in order to reduce
Aviall's net worth back to the intended $314 million. KPMG, in its role as
independent outside auditor, investigated and subsequently approved of
Ryder's treatment of the pension benefits and certified Ryder's books. 15
In December 1993, the spin-off was complete. 16 Shortly thereafter,
Aviall replaced KPMG as its independent auditor and announced its
7 See Aviall, 913 F. Supp. at 828.
8 See Aviall, 110 F.3d at 893-894.
9 See id. at 894.
10 See id.
11 Aviall, 913 F. Supp. at 828.
12 See id. at 829.
13 See id.
14 See Aviall, 110 F.3d at 894.
15 See Aviall, 913 F. Supp. at 829.
16 See Aviall, 110 F.3d at 894.
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objection to Ryder's allocation of the pension benefits.17 Then, in
November 1994, after several months of negotiations, Aviall notified Ryder
that Aviall was officially disputing the allocation of the pension benefits.18
Pursuant to section 3.03(c) of the Distribution Agreement, Aviall sought
arbitration before KPMG.19 In preparation for the arbitration, Ryder sought
and received some assistance from KPMG. 20 Then, in December 1994,
Aviall requested that KPMG withdraw as arbitrator and, when KPMG
refused, Aviall filed a complaint with the district court.21
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Aviall's initial complaint sought a declaration from the court system
that KPMG be prohibited from arbitrating the dispute. 22 Ryder responded
by moving the district court to dismiss Aviall's complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, to stay the litigation
pending the outcome of the arbitration.23 After discovery, both parties
moved for summary judgment. 24 Aviall argued that the Distribution
Agreement was a "contract of adhesion" and therefore not enforceable. 25
Alternatively, Aviall argued that, under the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), 26 the district court has the power (and the duty) to remove an
arbitrator who is "biased or evidently partial." 27
First, based upon relevant case law, the district court determined that
this was not a contract of adhesion. 28 Despite claiming that the negotiation
process employed by Ryder was oppressive, Aviall was unable to produce
any evidence of high-pressure tactics or procedural unfairness. 29 Further,
although Aviall may not have been represented by independent counsel at




20 See id. at 894-895.
21 See Aviall, 913 F. Supp. at 830.
22 See Aviall, 110 F.3d at 895.
23 See id.
24 See id.
25 See Aviall, 913 F. Supp. at 831.
26 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
27 Id. at 833.
28 See id. at 831-833.
29 See id. at 832.
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sign the contract and the contract was unanimously approved by Aviall's
Board of Directors. 30 Additionally, Ryder's conduct was entirely consistent
with traditional principles of corporate governance. 31 Finally, Aviall was
unable to produce any case law suggesting that the process employed by
Ryder was unduly oppressive or in violation of public policy. 32
Second, based upon the statutory language of section 10 of the FAA,
the district court found Aviall's action to be premature. As a matter of law,
the district court found that courts are only permitted to remove arbitrators
when "[(1)] one party has deceived the other, [(2)] unforeseen intervening
events have frustrated the intent of the parties, or [(3)] the unmistakable
partiality of the arbitrator will render the arbitration a mere prelude to
subsequent litigation." 33 Based upon the evidence, the district court found
that there was no deception, unforeseen intervening events, or unmistakable
partiality on the part of the arbitrator. 34 Given these facts, the district court
held that it could only adjudicate the partiality of an arbitrator after the
arbitrator had exercised her duties and not before. 35
Therefore, on February 7, 1996, the district court granted Ryder's
motion for summary judgment. 36
IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF
THE DISTRICT COURT
Aviall appealed the district court's interpretation of the FAA, primarily
arguing that the FAA grants courts the authority to disqualify arbitrators
who have demonstrated bias or evident partiality and that KPMG's
relationship with Ryder, as well as KPMG's conduct in connection with this
dispute, demonstrates this partiality. 37
Similar to the district court, the Second Circuit found the FAA to be
the relevant statutory authority. 38 The FAA explicitly provides that "[a]
written provision... evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle
by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 See id. at 833.
33 Id. at 836.
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 826, 836.
37 See Aviall, 110 F.3d at 895.
38 See id.
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transaction .. shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."39 The Second Circuit interpreted this as strongly suggesting that
the legislature did not intend for courts to tread upon and interfere with
legitimate contracts detailing arbitration.40
The FAA does not, however, strictly prohibit all judicial interference
with the decision of an arbitrator. 41 Section 10 of the FAA- incidentally,
the only section which discusses judicial interference with an arbitrator's
award-allows courts to vacate an arbitrator's award under the following
specific circumstances:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration-
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.42
Perhaps more importantly, the FAA does not provide for any pre-
award removal of an arbitrator. 43 As precedent, the Second Circuit cited its
decision in Michaels v. Mariforum Shipping, S.A.,44 where it held that, "a
district court cannot entertain an attack upon the qualifications or partiality
of arbitrators until after the conclusion of the arbitration and the rendition
of an award." 45
Aviall had supported its argument in favor of allowing courts to remove
arbitrators prior to executing their duty by citing a variety of cases. 46 The
Second Circuit, however, characterized these cases as only calling for the
pre-award removal of an arbitrator when the agreement to arbitrate would
39 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
40 See Aviall, 110 F.3d at 895.
41 See id.
42 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994) (emphasis added).
43 See Aviall, 110 F.3d at 895.
44 624 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1980).
45 Id. at 414 n.4.
46 See Aviall, 110 F.3d at 895-896.
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be invalid under general contract principles. 47 In Erving v. Virginia Squires
Basketball Club,48 one of the cases cited by Aviall, the parties entered into
a contract requiring any dispute to be resolved by a neutral arbitrator-the
Commissioner of the American Basketball Association (Association).49
When Julius Erving brought forth his complaint, however, the original
Commissioner had been replaced by Robert S. Carlson, a partner in the
law firm representing the defendant. 50 This result was neither intended nor
contemplated at the time the parties agreed to this arbitration clause. Thus,
the district court removed the arbitrator because the parties did not foresee
this result and their intent of having a neutral arbitrator was being
frustrated. 51 Contrast this to the facts determined by the district court in
Aviall- the parties' overriding purpose in selecting KPMG as arbitrator
was not neutrality; the parties' primary goal was to select an arbitrator who
was knowledgeable about both companies' financial statements and the
terms of the Distribution Agreement. 52 Therefore, the guidance set forth by
the district court in Erving was no longer relevant because, in Aviall, the
parties were neither surprised, nor was their intent frustrated by the naming
of KPMG as arbitrator. 53
Aviall also cited the court's decision to remove the arbitrator in
Masthead Mac Drilling Corp. v. Fleck.54 In Masthead Mac, however, the
district court found that the defendant hid the fact that the contractually
designated arbitrators were past or present business associates of the
defendant. 55 By concealing the arbitrator's true relationship with the
parties, the defendant acted fraudulently. 56 Due to this fraud, the court
decided to remove the arbitrator prior to the execution of the arbitrator's
duties. 57 In Aviall, however, the parties were completely knowledgeable
about KPMG's business relationship with both Ryder and Aviall; there was
47 See id. at 896.
48 349 F. Supp. 716 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
49 See id. at 717-718. It should be noted that this is how the Second Circuit
characterized the facts of the case. Whether this is a fair interpretation of the facts is
discussed infra Part V.
50 See Erving, 349 F. Supp. at 719.
51 See id.
52 See Aviall, 913 F. Supp. at 835.
53 See id.
54 549 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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no fraudulent concealment. 58 Therefore, the Second Circuit also found that
the guidance set forth by Masthead Mac was not relevant.59
In fact, Third National Bank v. WEDGE Group, Inc.60 is the only case
cited by Aviall in which a court removed an arbitrator whose relationship
with one party was both disclosed and foreseen. The district court in
WEDGE based its decision on section 10 of the FAA, Erving, and
Masthead Mac.61 Without much discussion, the district court in WEDGE
interpreted section 10 of the FAA as allowing the court to remove an
arbitrator who was evidently partial. 62 Then, based upon Erving and
Masthead Mac, the WEDGE court concluded that "[w]here the potential
bias of a named arbitrator makes arbitration proceedings a prelude to later
judicial proceedings challenging the arbitration award, a court can appoint
a neutral substitute arbitrator." 63
The Second Circuit ignored the WEDGE decision because the Second
Circuit had come to vastly different interpretations of section 10 of the
FAA, Erving, and Masthead Mac. First, the Second Circuit had interpreted
Erving and Masthead Mac as only permitting the removal of an arbitrator
prior to an award when the arbitrator's relationship with one of the parties
was not foreseen or fully disclosed.6a Second, the Second Circuit had
interpreted section 10 of the FAA as not providing for the pre-arbitration
removal of an arbitrator. 65
The Second Circuit also found it significant that Aviall had complete
knowledge of Ryder's relationship with KPMG when Aviall agreed to the
pertinent arbitration clause. 66 Aviall was "fully aware of KPMG's
relationship with Ryder when the Distribution Agreement was executed." 67
At the time of the agreement, it was just as likely that Aviall would have
continued to retain KPMG while Ryder would not. In retrospect, Aviall
probably regretted its decision to stipulate KPMG as an arbitrator, but the
fact remains that KPMG is the arbitrator Aviall bargained for and there is
nothing in contract law that prohibits a party from binding themselves to a
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 749 F. Supp. 851 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
61 See id. at 854.
62 See id.
63 Id. at 855.
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bad contract. 68 Most importantly, however, the FAA explicitly resists
judicial interference when two parties have a written provision detailing
how and by whom disputes are to be resolved. 69
Furthermore, Aviall could not argue that the Distribution Agreement
did not represent a meeting of the minds or that Aviall did not contemplate
a future in which either Aviall or Ryder would not maintain its business
relationship with KPMG. In fact, the Distribution Agreement clearly
contemplated the possibility that KPMG would not remain the outside
independent auditor of both parties, but still remain the designated
auditor.70 For example, the mere fact that other arbitration clauses exist,
such as section 3.11(n) of the Distribution Agreement and section 5.04 of
the Tax Sharing Agreement, suggests that the parties contemplated different
kinds of arbitrators for different kinds of disputes. Further, unlike the
arbitration clause in section 3.03(c) which designates KPMG as arbitrator
of all disputes arising under the Distribution Statement, sections 3.11(n)
and 5.04 make provisions for selecting an arbitrator if KPMG is no longer
the independent auditor for both companies. 71 Finally, the Second Circuit
did not disturb the district court's finding that, based upon the evidence,
section 3.03(c) was not drafted to reflect the parties' intent to appoint, nor
desire for, a neutral arbitrator. 72 Rather, this section "reflects an intent to
have the person most familiar with the technical underpinnings of any
dispute relating to the Distribution Statement resolve those disputes." 73
The Second Circuit found the argument that Aviall did not have a real
opportunity to negotiate the terms of the Distribution Agreement to be
without merit because Aviall could not point to any infirmities in the
68 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 374-375 (1990).
The rise of the bargain theory has contributed to this reluctance [of "policing"
contracts based upon fairness] by helping to strip from the doctrine of
consideration any vestige of concern with the substance of the exchange on which
the parties had agreed, thereby eliminating a possible basis for policing the
agreement for substantive unfairness. The doctrine of consideration shields the
promissor from liability if the promise is gratuitous, but not if the promissor has
received something, however small, by way of bargained for exchange.
Id.
69 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
70 See Aviall, 110 F.3d at 896.
71 See id.
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drafting process. 74 Ryder, meanwhile, had a fiduciary duty to draft the
terms of the Distribution Agreement in terms most advantageous to its
shareholders- the same individuals who would also be the shareholders of
the new entity Aviall. 75 In a spin-off transaction, officers of a subsidiary
owe a fiduciary duty only to the parent corporation, and neither the
parent's nor the subsidiary's officers owe a duty to prospective
shareholders. 76 Further, none of Aviall's initial shareholders were harmed
by the Distribution Agreement; any injury they might have suffered by the
reduction in Aviall's net worth would be offset by the increase in Ryder's
value.
V. FURTHER ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit's decision appears to be correct. In addition to the
reasoning put forth by the Second Circuit, the decision can be supported on
other grounds. First, the decision follows the words of the statute. If the
statute so provided, the court could remove an arbitrator prior to the
arbitrator rendering a decision. The statute, however, limits the court to
"vacating the award," ' 77 not "vacating an arbitrator." The only way a court
could "vacate the award" would be for the court to wait for the arbitrator
to actually make an award so that the court would have something to
vacate. Therefore, the Second Circuit's interpretation of the FAA follows
the letter of the statute, only permitting interference with an arbitrator's
decision after the arbitrator has had the opportunity to execute her duty.
Furthermore, this interpretation of the FAA is consistent with the goal
of judicial economy. If, for example, courts were to attempt to resolve the
impartiality of arbitrators before the fact, courts would spawn "endless
litigation and unnecessarily delay the resolution of disputes."' 78 Courts
would be asked to review an arbitrator both before and after the actual
arbitration. Attempting to determine the impartiality of an arbitrator prior
to actually making a decision, would be very difficult because of the
paucity of available evidence. After the arbitration, on the other hand, there
would be a substantial record upon which to adjudicate the arbitrator's
74 See Aviall, 110 F.3d at 896.
75 See id.
76 See id. at 896 (citing Andarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545
A.2d 1171 (Del. 1988)).
77 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
78 Marc Rich & Co. v. Transmarine Seaways Corp., 443 F. Supp. 386, 387-388
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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impartiality. While it is true that an arbitrator who is partial must recuse
himself, that decision is best left to the discretion and good judgment of the
individual arbitrator and not to the court, at least before an award is
rendered. 79 Therefore, from the standpoint of judicial economy, the Second
Circuit's interpretation of the FAA appears accurate.
Finally, this interpretation of the statute follows common sense. Prior
to the arbitrator executing her function, the court can only use the past to
make an informed guess regarding whether or not the arbitrator will act
impartially. Without a crystal ball, until the arbitrator has actually rendered
a decision, the court does not have any evidence upon which to decide
whether the arbitrator has demonstrated "evident partiality."
One possible criticism of the Second Circuit's opinion is that it does not
fairly characterize the facts in Erving. The Second Circuit asserts that this
case can be distinguished from the case at hand because the intent of the
arbitration clause in Erving was to establish a purely neutral arbitrator and
that the arbitrator named in the contract was not foreseen by both parties. 80
In Erving, the arbitration clause reads as follows:
13. Arbitration. In the event of any dispute arising between the PLAYER
and the CLUB relating to any matter or thing whatever, whether or not
arising under this Contract, or concerning the performance or
interpretation thereof, such dispute shall be determined by arbitration
before the Commissioner of the American Basketball Association, or a
person designated by such Commissioner in writing for such purpose,
acting as Arbitrator .... The PLAYER and the CLUB hereby grant such
Arbitrator full power to determine such dispute in such manner as he shall
direct, and under such rules of procedure as he shall in his sole discretion
adopt, and his decision shall be final, binding and conclusive and may be
enforced in any court, state or [flederal, having competent jurisdiction. 81
The district court's opinion does not include any evidence suggesting
what the primary intent of the parties was beyond the text of the clause.
The Second Circuit provides no evidence to support its assertion that
neutrality was the primary intent of the parties. In fact, the Commissioner
was an employee of the Association and, as such, was hired by and
ultimately responsible to the owners of the different basketball franchises
79 See Aviall, 110 F.3d at 895 (citing Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171,
174 (2d Cir. 1984)).
80 See id.
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within that league. As Commissioner, his primary responsibility was to
protect the interests of the league. Losing a player of Erving's caliber to a
competing basketball league would have caused irreparable harm to the
Association. Furthermore, it may not be entirely coincidental that, when
the initial Commissioner stepped down, he was replaced by a partner of the
legal counsel for one of the basketball franchises.
Finally, when the district court ordered that the arbitrator be replaced,
the court did not state that this was because Carlson, then the present
Commissioner, was incapable of being impartial or that, when the contract
was formed, the parties did not foresee that a partner of one party's legal
counsel would be the arbitrator. 82 The decision simply ordered that
"[u]nder the circumstances arbitration should proceed before a neutral
arbitrator and the order so provides." 83 In fact, at the time the contract was
signed, the parties could foresee that the person designated by the contract
to arbitrate their disputes was (1) hired to ensure the success and protect the
interests of the Association and (2) ultimately hired (and could be fired) by
the owners of the Association's basketball franchises. In that respect,
circumstances of the Commissioner and KPMG seem to be very similar.
Nevertheless, the cases cited by Aviall which lend the most support to
Aviall's position, WEDGE and Erving, are both district court opinions; the
Second Circuit is not bound by their precedent. 84
VI. AVIALL's EFFECT ON THE LAW
The Second Circuit's decision in Aviall has been followed in subsequent
district court decisions within the Second Circuit. In Diemaco v. Colt's
Manufacturing Co.,S5 for example, the plaintiff sought an order from the
district court compelling Colt to enter into arbitration with the original
panel of arbitrators. 86 The district court refused to make such an order,
holding that a court may only intervene in an ongoing arbitration if the
82 See id. at 719.
83 Id.
84 Arguably, Aviall does cite Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d
1064 (2d Cir. 1972), as supporting its position. The Second Circuit's opinion in Erving,
however, is limited to an appeal of the injunction granted by the district court and a
review of Erving's claim of fraud. See id. at 1066. Whether the district court had
properly interpreted the FAA was not at issue.
85 No. 3: 98CV523 (PCD), 1998 WL 381610 (D. Conn. June 26, 1998).
86 See id. at *2.
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arbitration agreement would be invalid under general contract principles.87
The district court went on to state that, "generally, parties to an ongoing
arbitration must await the award before seeking judicial review. Postaward
review is limited-parties may only move to vacate the award based on one
of the grounds set forth in section 10 of the FAA." 88
In addition, the Second Circuit's decision in Aviall has been followed
by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In In re
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London,89 the court found that the
arbitration clause in question was governed by the FAA and that, under this
law, "courts do not have authority to hear pre-award challenges to an
arbitrator designation on grounds of bias and partiality" 90 and may only
disqualify pre-award arbitrators when the agreement to arbitrate would "be
invalid under general contract principals.'"91
Finally, Aviall has been cited by many courts on other grounds, 92
ranging from the mundane (the court's role in competing motions for
proper grounds of summary judgment)93 to the more complex (resolving
whether res judicata or issue preclusion apply). 94
VII. CONCLUSION
Based upon precedent and statutory law, the Second Circuit held that
"an agreement to arbitrate before a particular arbitrator may not be
disturbed, unless the agreement is subject to an attack under general
contract principles as exist at law or equity." 95 An arbitrator cannot be
87 See id. at *4.
88 Id.
89 No. 97C 3638, 97C 3643, 1997 WL 461035 (N.D. 111. Aug. 11, 1997).
90 Id. at *3.
91 Id. at *3 (quoting Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Systems, Inc., 110 F.3d 892, 896 (2d
Cir. 1997)).
92 The Supreme Court of Alabama has cited to the Second Circuit's decision in
Aviall to support the notion that an agreement to arbitrate must be entered into freely by
both parties. See Investment Management & Research, Inc. v. Hamilton, No. 1960138,
1998 WL 122737, at *7 (Ala. Sup. Ct. Mar. 20, 1998); Allstar Homes, Inc. v. Waters,
711 So. 2d 924, 929 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1997).
93 See Frooks v. Town of Cortlandt, 997 F. Supp. 438, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
Rosenthal A.G. v. Ritelite, Ltd., 986 F. Supp. 133, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
94 See In re DG Acquisition Corp. v. Dabah, 151 F.3d 75, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1998);
United States v. Merit-Meridian Const. Corp., No. 90 Civ. 5106(DC), 1998 WL
549570, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1998).
95 Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Systems, Inc., 110 F.3d 892, 895 (2d Cir. 1997).
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removed prior to an award unless the contract is somehow invalid. Where
an arbitrator's relationship is "undisclosed, or unanticipated and
unintended," the contract may be invalid.96
In reality, however, this decision is an opportunity for the Second
Circuit to tell drafters what the court wants to see in future arbitration
clauses: what the parties are looking for in an arbitrator (e.g., neutrality,
highly informed, technical expertise) and who the parties foresee arbitrating
their dispute. The courts have recognized a public policy in favor of
arbitrating disputes rather than litigating them. Therefore, if a contract is
valid and enforceable, the courts will avoid interfering.
Eric Fink
96 Id. at 896.

